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Abstract
The Detect and Avoid (DAA) capability of a recent version (Run 3) of the Airborne
Collision Avoidance System-Xu (ACAS-Xu) is measured against that of the Detect
and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS), a reference algo-
rithm for the Phase 1 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
DAA. This comparative analysis of the two systems’ alerting and horizontal guid-
ance outcomes is conducted through the lens of the Detect and Avoid mission
using flight data of scripted encounters from a recent flight test. Results indicate
comparable timelines and outcomes between ACAS-Xu’s Remain Well Clear alert
and guidance and DAIDALUS’s corrective alert and guidance, although ACAS-Xu’s
guidance appears to be more conservative. ACAS-Xu’s Collision Avoidance alert
and guidance occurs later than DAIDALUS’s warning alert and guidance, and over-
laps with DAIDALUS’s timeline of maneuver to remain Well Clear. Interesting dis-
crepancies between ACAS-Xu’s directive guidance and DAIDALUS’s “Regain Well
Clear” guidance occur in some scenarios.
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Nomenclature
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
DAA Detect And Avoid
DAIDALUS Detect and AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems
Dmod modified distance
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FT2 ACAS-Xu Flight Test 2
GPS Global Positioning System
HMD∗ Horizontal Miss Distance Threshold
LoWC Loss of Well-Clear
MOPS minimum operational performance standard
PIC pilot in command
RA Resolution Advisory
RWC Remain Well-Clear
STM Surveillance and Tracking Module
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
CPA closest point of approach
TRM Threat Resolution Module
UAS unmanned aircraft system
VMD* vertical miss distance threshold
WC Well-Clear
WCV Well-Clear Violation
fpm Feet Per Minute
nmi nautical mile
τmod modified tau
1 Introduction
Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems are a critical component of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) to remain Well Clear (WC) [1] from and avoid collisions with other
airborne traffic. Manned aircraft rely on the pilot’s sight to see and avoid aircraft in
nearby airspace. DAA systems use surveillance sensors and algorithms to predict
losses of DAA Well Clear (DWC) and provide alerting and guidance to the Pilot
in Command (PIC) to ensure separation. Trade studies [2–5] and prototype DAA
algorithms [6, 7] have been developed to explore and characterize the technical
challenges of DAA. This technical work among others has enabled RTCA Commit-
tee 228 (SC-228) to publish Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS
DO-365) [1] 1 for DAA systems employed by UAS operating in non-terminal areas,
referred to as Phase 1 MOPS. This MOPS applies to UAS equipped with Auto-
matic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), active surveillance, and air-to-
air radar systems that detect aircraft without transponders. Phase 2 work to extend
the MOPS to additional UAS categories and operations is currently underway.
The alerting and guidance requirements in the DAA MOPS aim at avoiding losses
of DWC. The Phase 1 MOPS define the DWC condition by the aircrafts’ relative
position and velocity. Specifically, it defines the DWC condition by three thresholds:
projected horizontal miss distance, current altitude difference, and a nonlinear time
to horizontal violation called modified tau. A detailed mathematical definition of
DWC can be found in Appendix A. The Phase 1 MOPS defines three DAA alert
and guidance levels, Preventive, Corrective, and Warning, in increasing severity [1].
Preventive and corrective alerts and guidance are caution-level (shown to the PIC
in yellow/amber symbols). They are intended to provide awareness to the PIC that
there is a predicted loss of DWC, but that there is sufficient time to coordinate with
Air Traffic Control (ATC). The warning-level (shown to the PIC with a red symbol)
alerts and guidance are intended to inform the PIC that an immediate maneuver is
required. These caution and warning level alerts are in compliance with Advisory
Circular guidance on the use of alerts. The guidance is of a suggestive nature,
indicating a range of vertical and/or horizontal maneuvers predicted to result in a
loss of DWC. Maneuvers outside the indicated range are suggested to the PIC to
remain DWC. Figure 1 illustrates the heading and altitude guidance display to the
PIC. The red color indicates ranges that are predicted to lead to a loss of Well
Clear. If a loss of DWC is imminent and unavoidable by any maneuver, the DAA is
required to issue suggestive guidance in order to expedite regaining DWC.
DAIDALUS [6] is a DAA algorithm developed by NASA Langley Research Center
to support Phase 1 MOPS development. It serves as a reference of a MOPS-
compliant DAA algorithm. DAIDALUS takes a deterministic approach to alerting
and guidance calculations [6]. Aircraft states are represented as linear projections
of deterministic models obtained from surveillance sources such as ADS-B, active
1The complete RTCA DO-365 document referenced may be purchased from RTCA, Inc., 1150
18th Street NW Suite 910, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 833-9339, www.rtca.org
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Figure 1. Illustration of Warning guidance information (a) heading (b) altitude
(reprinted from MOPS DO-365 of RTCA with permission).
surveillance, or radar. Manned aircraft traffic is projected on constant-velocity tra-
jectories to a look-ahead time of 180 seconds. DAIDALUS provides discrete alert
levels for all nearby traffic based on time to intersection of a given alert zone. These
alerts align with alerting definitions defined in the Phase 1 DAA MOPS with buffered
volumes and timelines. DAIDAlUS’s guidance is of a suggestive nature in that it in-
dicates a range of maneuvers (and non-maneuvers) that would lead to conflicts,
without dictating a single maneuver for the pilot to follow. The types of maneu-
ver include heading, altitude, climb rate, and airspeed for corrective and warning
alert types as well as guidance to regain WC if a Loss of Well Clear (LoWC) is
unavoidable [6]. All possible maneuvers within the UAS’s performance are calcu-
lated at a given time step to detect maneuver regions that would result in a LoWC
with projected traffic within the look-ahead time. Figure 2 summarizes DAIDALUS’s
high-level design principles.
Figure 2. DAIDALUS alert and guidance design principles [6]
The Aircraft Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS-X) [7] is envisioned by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) to be a critical component that supports the
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safety of the Next-Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). ACAS-X will
replace the currently deployed Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS-
II) [8] in the near future. The UAS-variant of ACAS-X, called ACAS-Xu, is currently
under development. Recently, ACAS-Xu’s capability has been extended from the
collision avoidance time regime to longer look-ahead times so as to provide DAA
alert and guidance. This extension aims at meeting the DAA functional requirement
defined by the Phase 1 MOPS. In contrast to the deterministic approach used by
DAIDALUS, ACAS-Xu uses cost analysis, dynamic programming, and probabilistic
state distributions to calculate alerting statistics and guidance. ACAS-Xu repre-
sents aircraft states and dynamics non-deterministically [9]. Aircraft and sensor
models are applied to surveillance data sources to develop probability distributions
of aircraft states. The Surveillance and Tracking Module (STM) correlates and as-
sociates aircraft states as well as their probability distributions. These state distri-
butions are applied to pre-calculated dynamic programming tables to estimate rele-
vant alerting information, such as time to LoWC or Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC).
The Threat Resolution Module (TRM) then uses a combination of state distribu-
tions and statistical output from dynamic programming to select the best maneuver
based on several cost factors [7,10].
Both systems interact with the pilot in a combination of alerts and suggestive guid-
ance. ACAS-Xu also issues directive guidance called Resolution Advisories (RA),
indicating the severity, sense, and strength of a necessary maneuver. These RAs
can occur in horizontal, vertical, or mixed type maneuvers as selected by the Nu-
cleus module [7]. Complimentary to RAs, ACAS-Xu’s suggestive guidance is calcu-
lated in the horizontal dimension, indicating ranges of headings that the PIC should
avoid to prevent a LoWC in the near future.
This report compares the DAA alerting and guidance performance of DAIDALUS
and ACAS-Xu algorithms using flight test data flown with scripted encounters. The
performance of both systems is also measured against the Phase 1 MOPS for
alerting and guidance. The results reveal striking similarities and some differences
between the two systems, and can inform further development of both.
2 Methods
The comparison in this work uses flight test data flown with scripted encounters.
ACAS-Xu alerting and guidance data were generated and collected in real time dur-
ing the flight test. DAIDALUS alerting and guidance data were generated after the
flight test, by processing the flight test collected aircraft data through DAIDALUS.
The following sub-sections describe the data generation and collection processes
in detail.
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2.1 ACAS-Xu Flight Test 2
ACAS-Xu Flight Test 2 (FT2) was conducted between June and August of 2017 over
Edwards Air Force Base in order to test new capabilities implemented in ACAS-X
Run 3. A total of 250 scripted encounters were flown. A small percentage of these
encounters were flown with the intention to test the new DAA alerting and guidance
capabilities. These DAA additions included suggestive and directive horizontal ma-
neuver guidance to meet DAA corrective alert timelines.
This work analyzes data from a total of seven of the 250 encounters, including six of
the mitigated DAA encounters and one unmitigated (fly-through), not-DAA-specific
encounter. Table 1 shows test cards for these seven encounters. Test cards with
the prefix RWC were designed to test new DAA capabilities in ACAS-Xu Run 3.
Among these encounters, RWC-03, RWC-12, and DA-62 were head-on (with a
safety horizontal offset), RWC-09 and RWC-18 were at a 90 degree angle, and
RWC-06, and RWC-15 were at a 45-degree angle. Test card DA-62 was included
in order to examine the behavior of the DAA systems in an unmitigated scenario
where a LoWC occurs. Among the six RWC encounters, RWC-03, RWC-06, and
RWC-09 were flown with ACAS-Xu configured in the DAA Mode, whereas RWC-
12, RWC-15, and RWC-18 were flown with ACAS-Xu configured in the Policy Mode.
The DAA Mode was meant to capture the DAA caution alert and advisories times
defined by the MOPS, whereas the Policy mode was for the unadulterated ACAS
Xu alert and advisory time.
Table 1. ACAS-Xu FT2 Scripted Flight Parameters [11]
The seven encounters were flown with the three geometries outlined in Figure 3.
Each encounter involved one UAS and a small manned utility aircraft similarly
equipped to the UAS, running ACAS-Xa [7] and TCAS II [8]. These UAS and
manned aircraft are referred to as ”Ownship” and ”Intruder”, respectively, through-
out this analysis. The Ownship for each test was a Mode-S and ADS-B equipped
Ikhana Predator-B UAS running ACAS-Xu controlled by a test pilot on the ground.
During these encounters, ACAS-Xu perceived Ownship to be unable to maneu-
ver vertically, consequently only horizontal guidance was calculated, and tracks
were produced from the ACAS Surveillance and Tracking Module (STM) correlation
tracker with an ADS-B transceiver as its source. RWC encounters were mitigated,
as the Ownship pilot was instructed to follow ACAS-Xu corrective guidance after a
response delay timer had expired. The DA-62 encounter had similar geometric and
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equipage parameters to those with the RWC prefix, but Ownship was not perceived
to have limited maneuverability and RA dimension was determined by the ACAS-X
Nucleus module.
Figure 3. Scripted Flight Geometries [12]
2.2 Flight Data Processing
This analysis was conducted using data recorded from the ACAS-Xu FT2 flight
test. Surveillance data, Ownship states, and ACAS-Xu output were recorded on-
board the Ownship, downlinked, and recorded via the Live Virtual Constructive
Distributed Environment (LVC DE) interface. These LVC DE messages included
absolute aircraft states for all traffic including Ownship, updated at 1 Hz, and ACAS-
Xu guidance and alerting data payloads.
DAIDALUS alerting and guidance was produced by feeding the LVC DE messages
to DAIDALUS in a post-processing fashion. DAIDALUS requires that traffic states
be aligned to Ownship time steps. To support this, blocks of traffic states were
linearly interpolated forward in-track to Ownship time assuming constant velocity.
This simple ”last block” linear interpolation technique produced only modest errors
in position, 97 ft from GPS location on average (see Figure 4).
2.3 DAIDALUS Simulation
The behavior of DAIDALUS is highly configurable. Alerting thresholds, hazard zone
parameters, and perceived aircraft performance can be configured to support dif-
ferent analysis scenarios. For this analysis, a standard configuration file2 designed
to be MOPS compliant with a 3-degree-per-second turn rate was applied. This
configuration defines three alert zones—preventive, corrective, and warning—in
increasing severity. Only the corrective and warning alerts are investigated in this
work. Both alert zones were buffered to a 1-nmi Horizontal Miss Distance threshold
(HMD*), with 60 and 30 second time to alert thresholds to corrective and warning
alert zones respectively. Additionally, guidance to regain Well Clear was calculated
2WC SC 228 nom b.txt
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Figure 4. LVC DE and Interpolated Position Error
and is referred to as recovery bands in this analysis. Using this configuration, guid-
ance data and statistics were collected from DAIDALUS and compared to ACAS-Xu
in terms of alerting times, guidance coverage, and other behaviors.
The DAIDALUS algorithm is provided as an open-source library3 maintained in Java
and C++ versions. This analysis was conducted using DAIDALUS release V-1.0.1-
FormalATM-v2.6.2. A basic framework for controlling DAIDALUS was written in
MATLAB using the DAIDALUS Java library. This framework was used to calculate
guidance and alerting statistics from input scenario files generated from flight test
data.
3 Analysis
DAA systems interact with the UAS pilot by displaying multi-level alerting and sug-
gestive guidance information. The latter is based on the outcome of a range of
maneuvers that the pilot should avoid, generally referred to as bands. These bands
change severity based on an intruder’s alert level and predicted time to intersec-
tion of an alert zone. Once the warning bands are saturated (meaning imminent
loss of DWC) it is necessary for a DAA system to provide a range of maneuvers
(recovery bands) that the PIC can maneuver to in order to regain DWC as soon as
possible. Alerting and maneuver guidance performance and statistics of ACAS-Xu
are compared against DAIDALUS.
3.1 Alerting
The Phase 1 DAA MOPS defines alerting requirements using the Hazard Zone and
non-Hazard Zone (see Table 2). Appendix A describes their definitions in detail.
3http://www.github.com/nasa/wellclear
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Phase 1 DAA MOPS outlines required performance for a DAA system applied to
the test vectors outlined in Appendix P of the DAA MOPS [1]. The MOPS requires
that a DAA system provide corrective and warning level alerts at an average of 55
and 25 seconds before intersection of the corrective and warning hazard zones
respectively. The MOPS, nonetheless, does not dictate a specific way of alerting
algorithm implementation. This performance of DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu in the
analyzed scenarios is referenced to performance benchmarks outlined within the
MOPS.
Table 2. Parameters for DAA Alerting Requirements (reprinted from MOPS DO-365
of RTCA with permission)
DAIDALUS calculates alerts based on the predicted time to intersection of an alert
zone by a projected intruder. The alert zone is chosen to be slightly larger than the
alert’s Hazard Zone to account for sensor and trajectory uncertainties. Appendix A
describes the DAIDALUS alert zone parameters in detail. If this volume is to be
violated within a specified minimum time an alert for that volume is presented with
the highest level alert taking priority.
Figure 5 shows the alerting and guidance timelines of ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS.
The version of ACAS-Xu analyzed here provides two levels of alert, Remain Well
Clear (RWC) and Collision Avoidance (CA). ACAS-Xu’s collision avoidance alerts
are provided on similar timelines to TCAS II. The horizontal DAA additions to ACAS-
Xu are designed to extend these timelines to support look-ahead times applicable
to DAA requirements. The new DAA alert, the RWC alert, is expected to be issued
at approximately the same time as the start of a DAA corrective alert threshold.
It continues to be issued during the progression of an encounter until either the
conflict is cleared or a CA alert is issued. DAIDALUS, on the other hand, pro-
vides discrete alerts for each DAA threshold and Regain-WC guidance calculated
at approximately the DAA WC threshold.
To facilitate comparison, the two ACAS-Xu alert levels are mapped to the corrective
and warning alert levels for DAIDALUS, respectively (see Table 3.) It is important
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Figure 5. ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS Alerting Timelines [10]
to note that ACAS-Xu CA alert is not intended to provide DAA warning level alerts.
The comparison between ACAS-Xu Collision Avoidance and DAA warning is imper-
fect as these refer to the alerts pertaining to NMAC and intersection of the warning
hazard zone respectively. As such it is not expected that ACAS-Xu meet Phase 1
DAA warning thresholds requirements in alerting or guidance. Phase 2 of the DAA
MOPS is expected to address the RWC guidance techniques used by ACAS-Xu in
separate requirements for the proven robust ACAS-X method.
Table 3. Equivalent DAA Alert Level
Figure 6 shows the alerting time before Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and LoWC
in both alert levels for both systems during the seven encounters. The actual hori-
zontal CPA was used as the reference point for CPA time. LoWC time is set to the
time DAIDALUS’s recovery bands start. This time is usually a few seconds before
the aircraft enters the alerting zone. Both DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu provide correc-
tive level alerts before the corrective requirement threshold specified by the DAA
MOPS. ACAS-Xu issues RWC alerts 3 seconds earlier than DAIDALUS’s corrective
alerts on average. This is before the 55 second corrective alert average threshold
as expected. DAIDALUS issues warning alerts between 10 and 15 seconds ear-
lier than ACAS-Xu’s CA alerts. While ACAS-Xu’s CA alerts fall outside of the DAA
warning alert threshold, this is expected due to differences between the volumes of
NMAC and DWC.
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Figure 6. Alerting Time Before CPA and WCV
Interestingly, no CA alerts were observed for the three encounters (RWC-03, RWC-
06, and RWC09) for which ACAS-Xu was configured in the DAA Mode. It was
not clear whether this discrepancy was due to the ACAS-Xu configuration. The
DAA Mode and Policy Mode are supposed to differ in the time for the caution level
alert and guidance, not for the warning level (the CA alert). Moreover, Appendix B
shows that RWC-03, RWC-06, RWC-09 all led to DAIDALUS’s Regain-WC bands,
whereas RWC-12, RWC-15, and RWC-18 never triggerred DAIDALUS’s Regain-
WC bands. This seems to indicate that differences in the execution of these two
sets of encounters led to the different alerting behavior.
3.2 Maneuver Guidance
Only horizontal DAA guidance is compared between the two systems as the DAA
vertical guidance of ACAS-Xu has not been implemented in Run 3. Inclusion of
DAA guidance in the vertical dimension is planned for future releases of ACAS-Xu.
Figure 7 shows the maneuver guidance for test card RWC-12. Horizontal maneu-
ver guidance bands, in corrective and warning severities, with respect to Ownship
heading are plotted along the Y-axis and time elapsed from the beginning of the
test card along the X-axis. Negative headings correspond to left turns while positive
headings correspond to right turns. These plots for test RWC-12 are representative
of maneuver guidance performance observed across all scenarios. Similar plots for
the remaining six scenarios can be found in Appendix B.
It was observed that DAIDALUS’s corrective guidance and ACAS-Xu’s RWC guid-
ance occur within 3 to 5 seconds of each other in the same region. ACAS-Xu was
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Figure 7. RWC-12 Maneuver Guidance
more conservative, suggesting larger corrective bands than DAIDALUS in both turn
directions around Ownship’s heading. As the aircraft converged and the range of
conflict-free maneuvers moved outside of Ownship performance, the bands grew
saturated in both directions, indicating to the pilot that coordination and mitigation
is necessary.
DAIDALUS produced warning level bands at 81 seconds elapsed, approximately
30 seconds before LoWC. ACAS-Xu produced smaller CA bands in the same re-
gions 15 seconds later on average than DAIDALUS and later than the average DAA
warning alert threshold. This is consistent with the onset delay in the warning-level
alerts reported in Section 3.1. CA bands calculated by ACAS-Xu were consistently
25 to 35 degrees smaller than those calculated by DAIDALUS before saturation.
Interesting behavior of ACAS-Xu’s corrective level guidance bands is seen in sev-
eral scenarios, including RWC-12 in Figure 7. Between approximately 75 and 90
seconds elapsed in RWC-12, ACAS-Xu’s corrective bands were saturated in both
directions, no directive CA heading was calculated, and no horizontal RA’s were
produced. During these 15 seconds there was no positive (i.e., recommended)
guidance presented to the PIC. This indicates that there were no actions that the
PIC could take in order to maintain or regain separation. This is in contrast to
DAIDALUS’s guidance bands which indicate possible maneuvers to the right and
left during these times. Phase 1 DAA MOPS specifies that a DAA system shall
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always provide positive guidance information unless in the condition of NMAC4 [1].
Future versions of ACAS-Xu should address this gap and make sure guidance is
always available.
3.3 Regain Well-Clear Guidance
If the Ownship penetrates the RWC alerting zone deep enough, ACAS-Xu calcu-
lates horizontal directive guidance in the form of a heading to turn to. The hor-
izontal directive guidance is also called a horizontal resolution advisory (RA). In
general, ACAS-Xu may generate both horizontal and vertical resolution advisories.
Its Nucleus module decides whether to issue a horizontal, a vertical, or a blended
resolution advisory. In the case that a horizontal resolution advisory is issued, the
PIC is expected to command the aircraft to these headings in order to maintain
separation and avoid NMAC. In contrast, DAIDALUS calculates recovery bands
once a loss of Well Clear is unavoidable (with horizontal maneuvers). These re-
covery bands indicate a range of maneuvers that the PIC should take in order to
regain WC in a timely manner. Figure 7 shows the directive guidance of ACAS-Xu
starting at 90 seconds, about 20 seconds before DAIDALUS issues the recovery
bands. Among the other encounters analyzed, ACAS-Xu calculated CA maneuver
guidance about 25 seconds before DAIDALUS issued the recovery bands (see Ap-
pendix B).
Figure 8 shows the normalized amount of directive guidance headings calculated
by ACAS-Xu that agree with DAIDALUS Regain-DWC guidance bands.
Figure 8. Regain Well Clear Guidance Outcomes
Agreement is considered to be when ACAS-Xu directive CA headings occur within
a DAIDALUS DWC recovery band, or outside of DAIDALUS corrective or warning
4MOPS 238
11
bands. For quantitative comparison of regain DWC guidance, probability of inter-
section was calculated as the ratio of headings in agreement to the total number
of calculated CA hearings. These headings are agreeable with DAIDALUS guid-
ance, falling within DAIDALUS non-alerting or recovery bands with a 0.87 probabil-
ity globally and in complete agreement in 5/7 scenarios as seen in the histogram
on the left in Figure 8. The right histogram of Figure 8 indicates the frequency
of an ACAS-Xu directive CA heading occurring at a given distance to the nearest
DIADLUS corrective or warning band edge. ACAS-Xu directive headings appear
to deviate minimally from the Ownship’s current heading, diverting 25 degrees on
average from the nearest DAIDALUS corrective or warning band edge.
4 Anomalies
4.1 Alerting Toggle
The deterministic aircraft model used by DAIDALUS is susceptible to uncertain-
ties in aircraft state data in some situations. Figure 9 shows how DAIDALUS was
observed to drop maneuver guidance and decrease alert level due to perceived
Intruder vertical divergence. This behavior was observed in all RWC scenarios.
These scenarios occurred with Ownship offset vertically 300ft above the intruder.
When linearly projected, these intruders appeared to not intersect the 450ft Verti-
cal Miss Distance threshold (VMD*) of the corrective alert zone during one of these
negative peaks. This effect becomes less pronounced as CPA gets nears, less
time is allowed for the projected Intruder to descend resulting in steady alerting
and guidance.
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Figure 9. DAIDALUS Bands and Alerting With LVC DE Source
This toggling behavior was not present when Intruder GPS logs were used as a
surveillance source for DAIDALUS. Finer altitudes and smaller fluctuations in In-
truder vertical climb rate kept the projected Intruder within the lower vertical bound
of the hazard zone throughout the scenario. Similarly, as seen in Figure 10, sce-
nario DA-62 which occurs with a smaller 200 ft vertical offset did not experience this
behavior due to a wider buffer between the the Intruder altitude and the VMD* of
the alert zone. Gaps in the bands of these plots are attributed to sporadic missed
ADS-B updates, not an alerting toggle behavior. ACAS-Xu, using a probabilistic
aircraft and alerting model, maintained guidance in all of these scenarios despite
noisy and coarse surveillance data from ADS-B, radar, and unfavorable scenario
geometry.
Figure 10. RWC-12: DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Bands
The hysteresis provided by ACAS-Xu’s probabilistic approach could be a significant
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advantage in combating surveillance sources with high uncertainty or low resolution
such ADS-B or radar.
4.2 Regain Well Clear Reversal
Encounter DA-62 is an unmitigated encounter with a head-on trajectory and a 0.6
nmi lateral offset (see Figure 3). Ownship flew from west to east and the intruder
offset was to the north of the ownship at CPA. Horizontal guidance bands and di-
rective CA guidance from ACAS-Xu for this encounter are shown on the left side
of Figure 11. ACAS-Xu suggested a slightly Northerly relative target heading at
87 seconds elapsed, approximately 28 seconds before a LoWC. Interestingly, the
directive heading fell within the range of CA bands during this period of time, while
there appears to be conflict-free Southerly headings available. The directive head-
ing was therefore inconsistent with the CA bands, an undesirable behavior. This
behavior, nonetheless, was not observed in any other encounters analyzed. This
heading strengthened from -20 to -42 degrees relative to Ownship heading then
reverses direction at 129 seconds elapsed, 7 seconds past DAIDALUS’s time of re-
gain DWC, to +48 degrees relative to Ownship heading. In comparison, DAIDALUS
(shown on the right side of Figure 11) suggested a Southerly turn throughout the
encounter, calculating recovery bands between +6 and +40 degrees to right satu-
ration, i.e. only Southerly turns.
Figure 11. ACAS-Xu Guidance Reversal Behavior
5 Conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper compares the DAA alerting and guidance be-
havior of both ACAS-Xu Run 3 and DAIDALUS using flight test data from ACAS-Xu
FT2 in July, 2017. Alerting comparison results show that ACAS-Xu’s RWC alert
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starts at similar to slightly earlier times to DAIDALUS’s corrective alert. ACAS-
Xu’s CA alert starts at 10-15 seconds later than DAIDALUS’s warning alert, and
overlaps with DAIDALUS’s Regain-WC guidance times nearing LoWC. Guidance
comparison results show ACAS-Xu’s guidance is found to occur in similar locations
and to be more conservative compared to DAIDALUS’s, protecting a larger range
of headings from maneuvering. In these test conditions, ACAS-Xu’s horizontal di-
rective guidance usually started while the RWC bands were saturated and 10-15
seconds before the CA bands begin. DAIDALUS’s Regain-WC bands, on the other
hand, are not calculated until violation of the warning alert zone is imminent or
has occurred. ACAS-Xu’s horizontal directive guidance sense agreed with that of
DAIDALUS’s Regain-WC bands in most analyzed encounters. However, there are
notable discrepancies in the DA-62 where ACAS-Xu’s directive heading cut well
into both ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS’s bands. Further analysis of this scenario is
suggested to uncover the cause of this disagreement.
ACAS-Xu’s alerting and guidance appeared to be more resilient under the tested
sensor uncertainties, leaving no gaps in its time series of alert and guidance while
DAIDALUS stopped issuing alerts due to noise in the predicted vertical trajectories
moving out of the alerting zone. The gaps in DAIDALUS’s alerting and guidance
may be remedied by filters that reduce the vertical state’s uncertainty, either in the
surveillance tracker or in the DAA system itself.
This comparative analysis reveals striking similarities and differences between the
DAA performance of two distinct systems, ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS. With the
Phase 2 MOPS for DAA and MOPS for ACAS-Xu both in progress, the method-
ology and tools developed for this analysis will be useful for evaluation of upcoming
versions of both systems.
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Appendix A
Well Clear, Hazard Zone, Alert Zone, and Non-Hazard Zone
The DAA Well Clear (DWC) zone for the UAS targeted in the Phase 1 MOPS is
defined by thresholds of three parameters. It does not have distinct physical bound-
aries because the definition depends on two aircraft’s relative position and velocity
during an encounter. Figure A1 illustrates a DWC zone.
*
Figure A1. A schematic representation of the DWC zone.
The Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD) represents the two aircraft’s predicted mini-
mum horizontal distance during an encounter assuming constant velocities. The
parameter h represents the two aircraft’s current altitude difference. The time met-
ric modified tau, τmod, is an estimated time taken for the two aircraft to intersect the
”protection” disk. The range rate is negative for closing geometries. The positive
incremental distance modifier Dmod defines the radius of a “protection” disk around
the Ownship such that any intruder with a horizontal range less than Dmod is always
considered “urgent”. In this case, τmod = 0. The thresholds, denoted by an aster-
isk, for the HMD, h, and τmod are 4000 ft, 450 ft, and 35 sec, respectively. All three
parameters must simultaneously fall below their respective thresholds during an
encounter for the two aircraft to violate the DWC. Alerting algorithms are designed
to reduce the probability of violating DWC to a value required by the MOPS.
The definition of τmod is [13]
τmod =
 −
r2−Dmod2
rr˙ , r > Dmod,
0, r ≤ Dmod
(A1)
where r and r˙ are the horizontal range and range rate between the intruding aircraft
and the UAS, respectively. The value of Dmod must be equal to HMD∗ to avoid the
undesirable on-and-off alert during an constant velocity encounter [14].
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The Hazard Zone in Table 2 is defined in a similar way, using thresholds of the three
variables HMD, h, and τmod. The intruder and UAS are in the Hazard Zone when
their HMD, h, and τmod values all fall below the respective thresholds. The aver-
age, early, and late alert times are relative to the time at which the Hazard Zone is
violated.
DAIDALUS’s alert zone is also defined in a similar way to the Well Clear and Hazard
Zone, using thresholds of the three variables HMD, h, and τmod. The HMD thresh-
old is increased to 1.0 nmi to account for sensor and intruder intent uncertainties.
The Non-Hazard Zone in Table 2 is also defined in a similar way, except that the
UAS in a Non-Hazard zone when any of the three variables is above its threshold.
19
Appendix B
Maneuver Guidance Plots
RWC-03
Figure B1 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
03. RWC-03 is a mitigated scenario with a head-on trajectory. The PIC conducted
a right turn in accordance with ACAS-Xu suggestive guidance. Pilot mitigation
prevents LoWC, meaning no DAIDALUS recovery bands are calculated for this
scenario.
Figure B1. RWC-03 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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RWC-06
Figure B2 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
06. RWC-06 is a mitigated scenario with Intruder enclosing on Ownship from 45◦
North. Pilot mitigation prevents LoWC so DAIDALUS does not calculate recovery
bands during this scenario.
Figure B2. RWC-06 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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RWC-09
Figure B3 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
09. RWC-09 is a mitigated scenario with Intruder enclosing on Ownship from 90◦
North. The differences between ACAS-Xu’s CA and DAIDALUS’s warning guid-
ance can be seen clearly here. DAIDALUS produces warning guidance near the
Ownship heading to left saturation throughout the scenario. In contrast, ACAS-Xu
begins its CA guidance further from Ownship heading to left saturation as well.
Figure B3. RWC-09 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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RWC-12
Figure B4 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
12. RWC-12 is a mitigated scenario with Ownship and Intruder on head-on tra-
jectories. Very similar guidance performance is observed between ACAS-Xu and
DAIDALUS.
Figure B4. RWC-12 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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RWC-15
Figure B5 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
15. RWC-15 is a mitigated scenario with Intruder enclosing on Ownship from 45◦
North. It can be seen that both DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu produce suggestive
bands cautioning against both Northerly and Southerly turns as the scenario pro-
gresses.
Figure B5. RWC-15 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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RWC-18
Figure B6 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario RWC-
18. RWC-18 is a mitigated scenario with Intruder enclosing on Ownship from 90◦
North. ACAS-Xu’s directive guidance headings occur with the same Southerly
sense as DAIDALUS recovery bands but with insufficient strength to put them out-
side of DAIDALUS warning bands for a few alerts. Differences between ACAS-Xu
CA headings and DAIDALUS bands are minimal, diverging by 5 to 10 degrees. An
explanation for this may be ACAS-Xu’s directive headings are intended to avoid
NMAC while DAIDALUS bands are intended to avoid DWC, a much larger volume.
Figure B6. RWC-18 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
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DA-62
Figure B7 shows maneuver guidance and Regain-WC guidance for scenario DA-
62. DA-62 is an unmitigated scenario with a head-on trajectory. Because of this,
clear comparisons of ACAS-Xu and DAIDALUS alerting timelines can be made.
ACAS-Xu’s RWC guidance begins slightly before DAIDALUS and progresses to
cover the same regions. CA guidance occurs later than DAIDALUS but occur over
the same regions as well.
Figure B7. DA-62 DAIDALUS and ACAS-Xu Guidance Bands
A discrepancy between the sense of ACAS-Xu’s CA headings and DAIDALUS re-
covery bands is seen midway through the scenario. This scenario occurs with a
slight 0.6 nmi Northern horizontal offset. One hypothesized explanation for this be-
havior is the relatively large timeline that ACAS-Xu directive guidance occurs on
would allow for significant time to divert Ownship trajectory in either direction. In
this case, either sense being approximately equal in cost and probability. It is less
costly to increase the strength of the maneuver than than inverting its sense so
strength is increased as the encounter progresses. A limit is reached where such
a turn would no longer be viable or is outside of Ownship performance limits so the
maneuver’s sense is inverted. Further analysis of this scenario is suggested.
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